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THE PASSAGE OF PATENT RIGHTS UPON MERGER:

PPG

Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.-THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT EQUATES ASSIGNMENT
WITH TRANSFER BY OPERATION
OF LAW
INTRODUCTION

Patent licensing rights traditionally have been personal and nontransferable.' Thus, unless express consent to assignment is contained in the licensing agreement, patent rights cannot be assigned or otherwise transferred
to a third party. An exception to this rule has been recognized when two
licensees merge to form a single corporation. 2 In this instance, the consolidated company is considered the successor rather than the assignee of the
original company.3 Accordingly, it is arguable that even though a patent
right may be nontransferable to a third party, a license would fall within the
ambit of the common law and statutory rule allowing all the rights, privito pass by operation of law
leges and franchises of a constituent corporation
4
to the surviving corporation in a merger.
This line of reasoning has been rejected by the Sixth Circuit in PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,5 a case of first impression, which
held that the surviving corporation in a statutory merger did not acquire
patent license rights where provisions in the original licensing agreement6
against assignment and transfer did not contain an exception for merger.
1. The long line of federal cases recognizing patent rights as personal and nontransferable
have as their principal case Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886) which, in turn, relies on
Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883) and Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1852). See generall6 cases cited note 19 n/ra.
2. In Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893), the Supreme Court announced
that the rule of nonassignability was inapplicable to the case of merger. Citing Lightner v.
Boston & A.R. Co., 15 F. Cas. 514 (C.C. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,343), the Court stated that "a
license, though not usually transferable, is transmissible by succession to a corporation formed
by the union of two licensees succeeding to the obligations of both, for the reason that the consolidated company is the successor rather than the assignee of the original companies." 150 U.S. at 196 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court has thus recognized that Lightner v.Boston, in the case of
patent licenses, supplies a basis for the proposition that a merger is an exception to the general
rule of nonassignability.
3. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 196 (1893).
4. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognizes, it is well-settled statutory
and common law rule that all the rights, privileges, franchises and liabilities of a constituent
corporation vest in the successor corporation upon merger. Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Altes, 511 F.2d
280 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736,
741 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); In re Penn Central Sec. Lit., 335 F. Supp.
1026, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
This rule is embodied in the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 76(d) (1972) which
outlines the effect of merger or consolidation. This section of the Model Act has been adopted
by the legislatures in all states and the District of Columbia. COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED § 76 (2d ed. 1971, 1977 Supp.) [hereinafter referred
to as the M.B.C.A. ANNOTATED § 76(d)]. See the full text of § 76 of the Model Act in note 40

in/ra.
5.

597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
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Although the subject matter of PPGIndustries concerns the effect of merger
on nontransferable patent rights, unless isolated, Judge Lively's holding that
a transfer is a transfer, whether it occurs by operation of law or by a particular act of the parties, could affect a substantial body of law predicated on the
theory of continuity. 7 This would disrupt the orderly succession of corporate
rights by merger, as envisioned by the common law and the Model Business
8
Corporation Act.
PPG Industries.was predicated upon two theories, one factual and one
legal. The factual theory was that the trial court interpreted the licensing
contract incorrectly, and that the evidence indicated that the parties had
agreed to prohibit the transfer of the license to a successor in the event of
merger. The legal theory suggested that, even in the absence of an express
clause prohibiting the transfer upon merger, the passage of rights by merger
is the equivalent of assignment such that the general rule of patent nonassignability was controlling. Under both of these theories, Guardian was held
liable for infringement. Since the licensing contract contained no express
provisions regarding merger, and since the court's factual interpretation of
the contract was the result of traditional rules of construction, 9 this comment
will focus on the legal theory utilized by Judge Lively.
This comment will consider the competing principles of patent nonassignability and the free passage of rights by operation of law in order to
assess their applicability to the merger situation. It will be suggested that the
transfer of rights by operation of law is not the equivalent of assignment, and
furthermore, that there is little justification for the treatment of patent rights
as being distinct from other contract rights which would pass by operation of
law to the surviving corporation in a merger.
6. Although the cross-licensing agreements did not contain an express provision regarding
the passage of the licenses to a successor in the event of merger, the court of appeals construed
the contracts as impliedly prohibiting transfer by merger. See note 10 infra.
7. The theory of corporate continuity is illustrated in Vulcan Materials Co. v. United
States, 446 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). In Vulcan Materials, it was
necessary for the court to distinguish merger from dissolution to determine whether a claimed
capital expenditure was deductible under the Internal Revenue Code. The court defined
merger as:
[Tihe absorbtion of one corporation by another, which retains its name and corporate entity with the added capital, franchises, and powers of the merged corporation. It is the uniting of two or more corporations by the transfer of property to one of
them, which continues in existence, the others being merged therein.
446 F.2d at 694. The theory of continuity thus maintains that a corporation only loses its separate existence in a merger, and that all the franchises and powers of the merged corporation
continue in the surviving corporation. See Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch.
262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952); Argenbright v. Phoenix Finance Co., 21 Del. Ch. 288, 197 A. 124
(1936). See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7041 (perm. ed. 1971,
1979 Supp.).
8. See. note 40 infa for the full text of § 76(d) of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT.

9. As Corbin has stated: "[A] condition that is truly 'implied' is substantially an express
condition. It is a condition for the reason that the parties have so agreed; but their intention to
make it so has not been expressed in definite language." 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 653, at 132 (2d ed. Supp. 1971).

See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 267 (1973). Contra, S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 610, 610A (3d ed. Supp.
1979) (Williston's position is that the courts may not "rewrite the contract for the parties." Id.
§ 610A).
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PASSAGE OF PA TENT RIGHTS
T14E BACKGROUND OF
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PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.

The primary issue in this case was whether the surviving corporation in
a statutory merger acquired the patent license rights of its constituent corporation, where provisions in the licensing agreement prohibited assignment or
0
transfer and did not contain an exception for merger.' The issue arose as a
consequence of a 1964 licensing agreement between two glass manufacturers
10. There were eleven patents involved in this infringement suit. Two of the patents
originated as a result of the development work carried out at PPG Industries. The other nine
patents originated as a result of work carried out at Permaglass. The parties granted each other
rights to "gas hearth system" patents in the following language:
SECTION 3. GRANT FROM PERMAGLASS TO PPG
3.1. Subject to the reservation set forth in subsection 3.3 below, PERMAGLASS
hereby grants to PPG an exclusive license, with right of sublicense, to use
PERMAGLASS Technical Data in Gas Hearth Systems throughout the United States
of America, its territories and possessions, and all countries of the world foreign
thereto.
3.2. Subject to the reservation set forth in Subsection 3.3 below,
PERMAGLASS hereby grants to PPG an unlimited exclusive license, with right of
sublicense, under PERMAGLASS Patent Rights.
3.3. The licenses granted to PPG under Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 above shall be
subject to the reservation of a nonexclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free, world-wide
right and license for the benefit and use of PERMAGLASS.
SECTION 4. GRANT FROM PPG TO PERMAGLASS
4.1. PPG hereby grants to PERMAGLASS a non-exclusive, non-transferable,
royalty-free right and license to heat, bend, thermally temper and/or anneal glass
using Gas Hearth Systems, under PPG Patent Rights, excepting in the Dominion of
Canada, and to use or sell glass articles produced thereby, but no license, express or
implied, is hereby granted to PERMAGLASS under any claim of any PPG patent
expressly covering any coating method, coating composition, or coated article.
SECTION 9. ASSIGNABILITY
9.1. This Agreement shall be assignable by PPG to any successor of the entire
flat glass business of PPG but shall otherwise be non-assignable except with the consent of PERMAGLASS first obtained in writing.
9.2. This Agreement and the license granted by PPG to PERMAGLASS hereunder shall be personal to PERMAGLASS and non-assignable except with the consent of PPG first obtained in writing.
SECTION 11. TERMINATION
11.2. In the event that a majority of the voting stock of PERMAGLASS shall at
any time become owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a manufacturer of
automobiles or a manufacturer or fabricator of glass other than the present owners,
the license granted to PERMAGLASS under Subsection 4.1 shall terminate forthwith.
597 F. 2d at 1092.
The § 11.2 termination provisions only relate to the two patents granted to Permaglass by
PPG. There were no express provisions regarding merger of stock voting control regarding the
nine patents granted to PPG by Permaglass. Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that
the parties intended that the license wouldn't pass to a successor in a merger because the patent
was to be "personal" and "for the benefit and use of Permaglass." 597 F.2d at 195. If this was
their intention, why were the two PPG patents treated differently than the nine Permaglass
patents in the termination clause? Only the PPG patent licenses would terminate if Permaglass
came under the control of a competitor glass manufacturer. Given the specificity of the termination clause for the two PPG patents, and the inconsistent treatment of the nine patents vis-avis the two patents, it is hard to agree with the court's construction that a general intent to
prohibit transfer by merger of all eleven patents appear through an examination of §§ 3, 4, and
9 of the cross-licensing agreement. If the court's construction is inaccurate, and there was no
implicit agreement to prohibit transfer in the event of merger, then the court's holding is only
supported by its legal theory that the passage of right by merger is the equivalent of assignment,
which theory is criticized by this comment.
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and the subsequent merger of the licensee with a third glass manufacturer,
Guardian Industries.
The licensee, Permaglass Inc., was a small Ohio glass fabricator who at
first fabricated only flat glass pieces used in the appliance and automotive
industries. As the company began to prosper, its managers developed new
product lines and improved technologies. One development was a "gas
hearth" or "air float" process by which glass could be tempered and
fabricated while being supported on a bed of hot air. Permaglass soon
moved this process from the experimental to the production stage, and the
first gas hearth furnace became operational in 1963. At approximately the
same time, Permaglass discovered that PPG Industries had been working,
independently, on the same technology.
The two corporations soon entered into negotiations to ascertain their
respective patent positions. These negotiations culminated in a cross-licensing agreement dated January 1, 1964. Under the terms of this agreement,
Permaglass granted PPG an "unlimited exclusive license, with right of sublicense" to use the patent.11 Permaglass reserved personal and nontransferable rights to use its own process. In return, PPG granted Permaglass a
"nonexclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free right and license" to use the
PPG gas hearth patents.' 2 This cross-license also was personal and nontransferable and made no express provision for the event of merger.
In 1969, Permaglass merged with Guardian Industries Corporation, a
manufacturer of windshields for the automotive industry. In economic
terms, this consolidation was a textbook case of a front windshield manufacturer combining with a rear windshield manufacturer for the benefit of both.
Permaglass had by this time entered into the fabrication of tempered glass
for automobile side and rear windows. To increase its sales, the company
needed a larger distribution system and a more reliable source of raw glass.
Guardian manufactured front windshields, had a large national distribution
system, and needed an outlet for its raw glass producing facility. Thus the
merger not only solved the internal supply and marketing problems of both
companies, it also made the resulting company more competitive in the original autoglass market since automobile manufacturers prefer to fill all of
their glass needs from the same source.
Guardian was the surviving entity in the merger and it continued to
operate the furnace units that had been constructed and operated by
11. The patent statute specifically permits the issuance of exclusive licenses. Patent Act of
1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976). The grant of an exclusive license precludes the licensor from
granting other licenses, although the licensor may reserve the right to practice the invention
himself. Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957); Agrashell, Inc. v. Composition
Materials, 40 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
12. Nonexclusive licenses have no statutory basis, and are merely a waiver of infringement
under the licensed invention. L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857
(S.D.N.Y. 1939), affd 118 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1941). "In its simplest form, a license means only
leave to do a thing which the licensor would otherwise have a right to prevent. Such a license
grants to the licensee merely a privilege that protects him from a claim of infringement by the
owner of the patent monopoly." Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116,
118 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally Scaffetta, Nonexclusive Patent Licensees." The Lack of Riht to Sue for
Intfringement, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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Permaglass. PPG soon filed suit in federal court claiming patent infringement by Guardian through its use of the apparatus and process licenses
which had been granted to Permaglass. Guardian raised the defense that it
was a valid licensee because it had succeeded by merger to all the rights,
privileges and franchises which had been granted to Permaglass. The trial
court dismissed the action on the merits, holding that there had been no
assignment or transfer of patent rights. Rather, under the Delaware and
Ohio merger statutes, 13 the rights had passed to Guardian by operation of
law. The court noted that the "continuity of interest inherent in a statutory
merger distinguishes it from an ordinary assignment or transfer case. Different policy considerations are involved and they justify different treatment." 1 4 On appeal, the court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
held that the merger transferred the license to the successor by specific act of
5
the parties (2e. the intent to merge) and thus was equivalent to assignment.'
Accordingly, Guardian was held to have infringed upon PPG's patent rights.
While this holding provides clear guidance for the issue of the effect of
merger on patent rights, its rationale does not clearly flow from the holdings
of earlier patent cases, from case law relating to the passage of rights in a
merger, or from the merger statutes as represented by the Model Business
Corporation Act. 16 Moreover, Judge Lively's dismissal of the theory of continuity as being too "metaphysical"' 7 could disturb areas of law beyond that
13.

Both the Delaware and the Ohio merger statutes follow § 76(d) of the MODEL BuSI-

NESS CORPORATION ACT. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 1701.81 (A)(4) (Page 1978).
14. 428 F. Supp. at 796. The court in Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal Corp., 83 N.J.
Super. 120, 199 A.2d 48 (1964), concluded that different policy considerations require that the
passage of assets in a statutory merger be distinguished from ordinary assignment. The court
noted:
One who deals with a corporation must realize that the beneficial ownership of that
corporation can be changed at any time. Merger is only one of the ways which that
change can be made. To deny the benefit of a merging corporation's nonassignable
contracts in a merger authorized by statute would sharply limit the utility of such
statutes.
83 N.J. Super. at 124, 199 A.2d at 51.
15. Patent rights may still be transferred to the successor corporation in a merger, but only
by the rules governing assignment. Thus, should the parties wish transfer by merger, they
should make express provision in the contract. It is interesting to note that, in a 1969 patent
licensing agreement, Permaglass and Guardian provided that the licenses under that agreement
were not assignable "except to a successor to the entire business to which this agreement relates
.
597
.. F.2d at 1097. The 1969 agreement, however, was not intended to modify the 1964
agreement which was the subject of the litigation. Id.
16. See note 40 infra for the full text of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 76(d).
17. 597 F.2d at 1096. Judge Lively referred to an earlier case decided by the Third Circuit, Koppers Coal & Transp. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1939), in which the
court of appeals disparaged the theory of continuity by characterizing it as a theory whereby
"the underlying assets of the constituent corporation are taken up into the resultant corporation
precisely as specks of dust floating in drops of water are taken into a single merged drop." 107
F.2d at 707. Thus, the theory of continuity was dismissed as "metaphysical" and completely at
odds with the merger statute. Koppers held, as did the court of appeals in PPG Industries, that a
transfer by merger was not "wholly by operation of law" since a merger necessitates the voluntary act and participation of the constituent corporation. Id. at 708. Despite the eloquence of
Koppers' language, it appears that this holding, and not the theory of continuity, is completely
at odds with the merger statutes which state that "all property ...
shall be taken and deemed
to be transferred to and vested in such corporation without further act of deed." See the full text
of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION CODE § 76(d) note 40 infra. A fair reading of the stat-
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governing the drafting of patent licenses. The following section will discuss
these interrelated themes.

II.

PATENT RIGHTS ARE GENERALLY NOT ASSIGNABLE WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE GRANTOR

Although the Congress has specified that any interest in a patent has
8
the attributes of property and may be assignable,' patent licenses have long
been held to be personal to the licensee and nontransferable to a third party
9
This rule of construction
absent an express grant allowing assignment.'
owes its existence to a long line of federal cases predicated upon the 1886
20
This case established a sturdy
Supreme Court case of Hapgood v. Hewitt.
foundation for a general rule of nonassignability; however, it does not provide guidance for the issue of whether patent rights may pass to a successor
corporation in a merger, because it does not specify that transfer by operation of law is the equivalent of assignment. This section will analyze the rule
of assignability in order to assess its applicability to the merger situation.
The rule of patent nonassignability arises independently of the patent
statute. 2 1 It derives from the case of Hapgoodv. Hewitt which, in turn, relied
for authority on the earlier Supreme Court decisions in Troy Iron &Na/ Fac22
and Oi'ver v. Rumford Chemical Works. 2 3 These three cases
lory o. Corning
supply the fundamental principles for the view that patent licenses, unless
otherwise provided, are personal and nontransferable.
In Hapgood, the Court considered the effect of an assignment on the
ute indicates that the legislature intends that the assets should pass by operation of law and not
by act of the parties.
18. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976) provides:
Section 261. OwnershtAp assignment
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal
property.
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law
by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application
for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.
19. Lane & Bodley v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886);
Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883); Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1852); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelly Corp., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., 168 F.2d 919 (8th
Cir.), cert. dented 335 U.S. 892 (1948); Bowers v. Lake Superior Contracting, 149 F. 983 (8th Cir.
1906); Woods Harvester Co. v. Minneapolis Harvester Co., 61 F. 256 (8th Cir. 1894). See generaly A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 409 (2d ed. 1965).
This view has not been shared universally. In a well-reasoned opinion, Justice Traynor
rejected the federal view that patent rights are nonassignable noting that such a view "misconceives the policy of the federal patent statute and the relation between federal and state law in
the area of patent rights." Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 215, 308
P.2d 732, 740 (1957). Arguing that there is no specific federal policy governing the transferability of patents in merger, and that none of the Hapgood line of cases had been decided after Erie
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1933), Traynor applied the California policy of the free transferability of contracts. As indicated by the subsequent Unarco and Rock-Ola cases, Traynor's analysis
has had little impact on federal cases which have considered the assignability of patents after
Erie.
20. 119 U.S. 226 (1886).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1852).
23. 109 U.S. 75 (1883).
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grant of an equitable patent license. 24 The controversy arose when a small
manufacturer of agricultural equipment, Hapgood & Company, hired the
defendant to manage the production of "sulky" plows and to design an improved iron plow. 25 After the defendant completed the work in 1877, he left
the company and obtained letters patent on his improved design. Subsequently, believing that they had obtained an equitable license to use the
improved design because it had been designed while the defendant was in
their employ, Hapgood & Company assigned its license rights to a third
party. 26 Hapgood & Company then brought suit to enforce the transfer of
the letters patent to its assignee on the theory that patent rights are freely
assignable. The Supreme Court concluded that Hapgood & Company had
obtained an equitable license to use the patented plow design, but it held
that "[wihatever license resulted to the Missouri Corporation [Hapgood &
Company], from the facts of the case, to use the invention, was one confined
to that corporation, and not assignable by it."' 2 7 For this proposition the
Court cited Troy Iron & Nail Factorg v. Corning and Oliver v. Rumford. In Troy,
after concluding that the parties impliedly had agreed to prohibit transfer,
the Court held that "[a] mere license to a party, without having his assigns
or equivalent words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is
only the grant of a personal power to the licensee, and is not transferable by
him to another."' 28 Similarly, in Oi'ver, after the Court held that the parties
impliedly had prohibited transfer, the Court noted:
It is apparent that licenses of this character must have been
granted to such individuals as the grantor chose to select because of
their personal ability or qualifications to make or furnish a market
for the self-raising flour and thus for the acid [the invention], all of
which was to be purchased from the grantor. The license was to be
the failure of Morgan to per
made revocable by the grantor on 29
form his covenants and agreements.
In each of these cases the facts indicate that the parties had intended
that the license be personal, and that the licensor was dependent upon the
personal qualities of the licensee as a condition of the grant. None of the
cases cites a policy which would allow the generalization of such a conclusion into a fixed rule that all licenses are personal and nontransferable. The
bases for the Hapgood rule are the Troy and Oliver cases. But as Justice Traynor observed in a 1957 California patent case: "The statement in the Troy
24. Equitable licenses, or "shop rights," are implied licenses that usually arise when an
employee perfects a patentable device or process in the course of his employ. Equitable licenses
consistently have been held to pass to the resultant corporation in a merger. See, e.g., Papazian
v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v.
Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Wilson v. J.G. Wilson Corp., 241 F.
494 (E.D. Va. 1917).
25. The sulky, or riding plow, was arranged so that the plow was carried on a frame supported by wheels, and that the driver of the horses rode on the frame. During the year 1876, the
officers of Hapwood & Company thought it desirable to substitute an iron frame for the wooden
one. 119 U.S. at 229.
26. Although the Hapgood Plow Company did become the successor to the assets of
Hapgood & Company, it did so by assignment and not by statutory merger. Id. at 227.
27. Id. at 234.
28. Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 193, 216 (1852).
29. Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 83 (1883).
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case, however, was not necessary to the decision, and in Oliver v. Rumford
Chemical Works there were provisions in the license calling for the personal
30
Traynor
skill of the licensee even under ordinary rules of construction."
concluded that the federal rule of nonassignability "misconceives the policy
31
His criticism
of the federal and state law in the area of patent rights."
What
nonassignability.
rule
of
federal
illustrates a conceptual flaw in the
the
stated
first
glance,
At
ofnontransferabi/ity?
policy is served by a presumption
congressional policy that all "patents shall have the attributes of personal
32
is disserved by such a preproperty . . . [and] shall be assignable in law"
sumption. Moreover, if it is the protection of the inventor that is sought, it is
unclear how a presumption that patent holders rely more on the personal
qualities of the licensee than do other holders of property promotes the protection of inventions. Such a presumption is more appropriate in a world of
guilds and artisans than in the highly commercial world of today. It is clear
that if an inventor does wish that his patented process or apparatus only be
used by certain individuals or industries, he could quite easily place such
restrictions in his grant.
Despite its inapt beginnings, the rule of patent license nonassignability
33
Although
is a rule to which federal courts have consistently adhered.
of the
language
that
the
ground
on
the
explained
can
be
cases
of
these
many
34
many others have follicensing contract clearly excludes assignability,
lowed the holding of Hapgood v. Hewtt as an unquestioned rule of patent
law. 35 For example, citing Troy and Hapgood, the Seventh Circuit recently
held that:
We are of the opinion that the question of assignability of a
patent license is a specific policy of federal patent law dealing with
federal patent law. Therefore, we hold federal law applies to the
question of the assignability of the patent license in question ...
The long standing federal rule of law with respect to the assignability of patent license agreements provides that these agreements are
personal to the licensee and not assignable unless expressly made so
36
in the agreement.
Similarly, in WoodHarvester Co. v. Minneapohs, the Eighth Circuit considered
that "the absence of any words of assignability in [a] license shows an intent
to make it run to the [licensee] alone, as clearly as if words of nonassignabil30. Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal.2d 208, 215, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (1957).
31. Id. at 213, 308 P.2d at 737.
32. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976).
33. See note 19 supra.
34. See, e.g., Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., 168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948); Reynolds Spring Co. v. L.A. Young Indus., Inc., 101 F.2d 257, 260
(6th Cir. 1939); Niagara Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Hibbard, 179 F. 844, 845 (7th Cir. 1910).
35. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 195-96 (1893); Kenyon v. Automatic Instr.
Co., 63 F. Supp. 591, 593 (W.D.S.D.) rev'don other grounds, 160 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1947); Neon
Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Bowers v. Lake
Superior Contracting, 149 F. 983 (8th Cir. 1906); Wood Harvester Co. v. Minneapolis-Esterley
Harvester Co., 61 F. 256 (8th Cir. 1894). See also A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 409 (2d ed. 1965).
36. Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 929 (1973).
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37
ity had been incorporated therein."

By such analysis, the federal courts have created a fixed rule of nonassignability based upon the theory that a licensor relies on the personal qualities of the licensee. Regardless of the merits of this rule of nonassignability, it
does not appear to be applicable to the merger situation. To the contrary,
under the theory of corporate continuity, merger fulfills the presumed reliance upon the licensee's personal qualities, since all the qualities and assets
of the merging corporation continue in the successor corporation. At the
very least one could argue that, in the absence of a policy prohibiting transfer in a merger, the presumption that all rights and privileges pass by operation of law in a merger should prevail. The next section will analyze such a
presumption to determine its applicability to the passage of patent rights
upon merger.
III.

ALL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND FRANCHISES OF A CONSTITUENT
CORPORATION PASS BY OPERATION OF LAW TO THE
SURVIVING CORPORATION

The merger of one corporation with another does not contemplate the
winding up of the business of the merging corporation and the liquidation of
its assets. Rather, a primary object of merger is to continue the business of
the constituent, or merging, corporation. The extent to which the surviving
corporation may enjoy the assets of the former corporation, however, depends upon the legislatures that govern merger, since it is the sovereign who
confers the authority to consolidate. 38 With respect to the effect of merger or
consolidation, the legislatures of all jurisdictions of the United States have
adopted section 76(d) of the Model Business Corporation Act 39 which states
that in the event of merger, the "surviving or new corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights, privileges, immunities, and
franchises . . .of each of the merging or consolidating corporations . . .
land such property] shall be taken and deemed to be transfered to and
vested in such single corporation without further act or deed. .... 40
37. 61 F. 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1894).
38. Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 25 (1863); Pearce v. Madison & I.R. Co., 62
U.S. (21 How.) 441 (1860); Roddy v. Norco Local 4-750, Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, 359 So. 2d 957 (La. 1978). The sovereignty which determines the existence or nonexistence of a power in a corporation is the state. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d
971 (6th Cir. 1936).
39. M.B.C.A. ANNOTATED § 76(d), at 401-03.
40. Id. The statute provides as follows:
Section 76 EFFECT OF MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION
Upon the issuance of the certificate of merger or the certificate of consolidation by the
Secretary of State, the merger or consolidation shall be effected.
When such merger or consolidation has been effected:
(a) The several corporations parties to the plan of merger or consolidation shall be a
single corporation, which, in the case of merger, shall be that corporation designated
in the plan of merger as the surviving corporation, and, in the case of a consolidation,
shall be the new corporation provided for in the plan of consolidation.
(b) The separate existence of all corporations parties to the plan of merger or consolidation, except the surviving or new corporation, shall cease.
(c) Such surviving or new corporation shall have all the rights, privileges, immunities
and powers and shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of a corporation organized under this Act.
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Some states have supplemented the basic language of the Model Act to
make clear that the transmission of rights by merger is not governed by the
usual rules of law with respect to assignment. 4 For example, in 1977, Colorado added a sentence to its version of section 76(d) that reads:
Such transfer to and vesting in the new or surviving corporation
shall be deemed to occur by operation of law, and no consent or approval
of any other person shall be required in connection with any such
transfer or vesting unless such consent or approval is speifically requiredin
the event of merger of consolidation by law or by express provision tn any
contract, agreement, decree, order, or other provision to which
any
42
constituent corporation is a party or by which it is bound.
Thus, in Colorado, general provisions of nontransferability, such as those
involved in the patent licenses in PPGIndustries,would not operate to hinder
the passage of rights to the surviving corporation unless the particular contract contained express provision prohibiting transfer upon merger.
Even in the absence of a clear statutory presumption of the free transferability of rights, under the case law of numerous jurisdictions, the passage
of rights by merger long has been distinguished from assignment. For example, two Illinois cases, Albers v. McNuzho/s 43 and Essex International, Inc. v.
Clamage,44 illustrate the view that usually nontransferable instruments of
guaranty pass to the surviving corporation in a merger. 45 In Albers, the defendant, seeking recovery under an instrument of guaran'ty, argued that 1) a
party cannot gain benefit under a guaranty unless he is named in the original instrument, and 2) that the constituent corporation cannot transfer the
guaranty to the surviving corporation in a merger because the instrument is
non-negotiable. The trial court held for the defendant. The plaintiff argued
on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to distinguish between assignment and succession by merger. The court of appeals agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The court supported its holding by quoting
from a similar New York case, Bank of Long Islandv. Young 4 6 (the New York
(d) Such surviving or new corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the
rights, privileges, immunities, and franchises, of a public as well as of a private nature,
of each of the merging or consolidating corporations; andallproperty real, personal and
mixed, and all debts due on whatever account, including subscriptions to shares, and
all other choses in action, and all and every other interest of or belonging to or due to
each of the corporations so merged or consolidated, shall be taken and deemed to be transferred to and vested in such single corporation without further act or deed; and the
title to any real estate, or any interest therein, vested in any of such corporations shall
not revert or be in any way impaired by reason of such merger or consolidation;
d. (Emphasis supplied).
41. Discussing the 1977 addition to the Colorado Corporation Code, it has been noted that
"the addition makes it clear that contracts which provide that they 'cannot be assigned without
the consent of the parties hereto' do transfer to the surviving corporation in a merger or consolidation, unless the contract specifically requires consent to transfer in the event of a merger or
consolidation." Maer & Giacomini, The 1977 Revzswtns to the Colorado Corporation Code; 7 COLO.
LAW. 911, 926 (1978).

42. COLO.REV. STAT. § 7-7-105(2) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis supplied).
43. 301 Ill.
App. 551, 23 N.E.2d 220 (1939).
44. 440 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Illinois law).
45. An instrument of guaranty is an agreement to guarantee the payment of the obligation
of a third party to a creditor.
46. 101 A.D. 88, 91, 91 N.Y.S. 849, 850-51 (1905).
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and Illinois merger statutes are parallel):
The legislature did not contemplate that the property of one bank
merger in another should rest in the corporation in which the
merger takes place by operation of any assignment, or that such
transfer should be attended with the usual rules of law with respect
to assignment. The scheme is that the corporation which is merged
with another should lose its identity only so far as its separate existence is concerned, and that it should be swallowed up in the other,
and become an integral part thereof, carrying into the corporation
which survived all its rights, powers, liabilities and assets except the
indicia of a corporate body distinct from that into which it is
47
merged.
Essex v. Clamage also addressed the question of whether a corporate merger
would discharge the obligation of a debtor under a guarantee. The court of
appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, although Illinois recognized the
general rule of nonassignability of guarantees, merger does not affect an assignment because the essentials of the original contract are not materially
altered from that first contemplated. 48 Thus,
a merger involving a creditor corporation does not discharge a
guarantor any more than does a new change in corporate name.
Unless there is some material change either in the business dealings
between the debtor and the creditor or in the risk undertaken by
the guarantor, the obligation of the guarantor is not discharged.4 9
Accordingly, there are dual rationales supporting the general rule that instruments of guaranty pass to the surviving corporation even though they
are not transferable to a third party: 1) the legislatures intend that all property should pass freely upon merger, and 2) merger, unlike assignment, does
not materially alter the expectations of the parties since all of the qualities of
50
the former corporation survive in the resulting corporation.
These principles have been applied to many other types of nonassignable contracts: municipal licenses,5 liability insurance contracts, 5 2 real estate
leases,5 3 federal contract claims, 54 and equitable licenses. 55 In each of these
47. 301 Il1. App. at 554, 23 N.E.2d at 222.
48. Essex v. Clamage, 440 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. 440 F.2d at 550. This rule recognizing that instruments of guaranty pass to the successor in a merger, despite the fact that they are generally non-negotiable, has also been recognized
in New York and Ohio. Metro Corrugated Containers v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 85 F. Supp.
359 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (applying Ohio and New York law); Pantex Pressing Mach. v. United
States, 71 F. Supp. 859 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (construing federal tort claims statute and holding that
merger did not affect an assignment); Bank of Long Island v. Young, 101 A.D. 88, 91 N.Y.S. 849

(1905).
50. See, e.g., Metro Corrugated Containers v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 185 F. Supp. 359
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Burg, 32 F. Supp. 230 (D. Minn. 1940); Bank of United
States v. Glickman, 241 A. D. 92, 271 N.Y.S. 90, aJ'd 265 N.Y. 539, 193 N.E. 309 (1934); W. H.
McElwain Co. v. Primavera, 180 A. D. 288, 167 N.Y.S. 815 1917).
51. Diamond Parking, Inc. v. Seattle, 78 Wash. 2d 778, 479 P.2d 47 (1971).
52. Syracuse Lighting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 226 N.Y. 25, 122 N.E. 723 (1919).
53. Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club, 361 Mo. 981, 238 S.W.2d
321 (1951); Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 120, 199 A.2d 48 (1964).
54. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S. 655 (1921). In Seaboard, a successor
corporation sought payment for transportation services. The claim was acquired through
merger. The government defended with the argument that a federal claims statute prohibits
assignment of claims against the United States. The Supreme Court held that since the claim-
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cases a primary rationale was that the principles governing merger are distinct from rules of ordinary assignment. 56 A significant case in the area of
non-assignable contracts is DiamondParki'ng,Inc. v. Seattle.57 In Diamond Parkihg, the city of Seattle sought the payment of licensing fees from a newly
formed corporation that was operating several parking lots. The corporation
had acquired licenses to operate the lots through statutory merger with three
parking lot companies. 58 The city argued that since the licenses were nonassignable, the corporation had to pay new licensing fees to operate the parking lots. The corporation argued that it had acquired the licenses through
statutory merger, not by assignment, and thus was authorized to operate
under the licenses granted to the constituent corporations in the merger.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the Washington version of section 76(d) of the Model Business Corporation Act governed the construction
of the Seattle ordinance which rendered the licenses nontransferable. 59 The
Court noted the legislative purpose underlying the merger statute:
It was the evident legislative intent, in enacting these provisions, to
encourage the continuation of businesses so that their obligations
can be discharged. A corporation cannot reasonably be expected
to discharge its obligations and liabilities if it is deprived of its valuable assets, and the value of a license in carrying on a business can
hardly be questioned . . . . The statute does not provide that the
surviving corporation shall succeed to the rights, privileges and
franchises of the merger corporations, provided those rights, privileges and franchises are made assignable by the authority which
granted them. It provides,
without condition, that they shall pass
60
upon the merger.
ant had acquired his interest by operation of law and not by assignment, the claim should be
allowed. The Court noted:
As agreed and provided by the laws of the two states, the rights, privileges, franchises,
and all property, real, personal, and mixed, and all debts on every account, as well as
stock subscriptions and other things in actidn belonging to each of the constituents,
were transferred to and vested in the consolidated corporation without further act or
deed "as effectually as they were in the former companies."

256 U.S. at 656.
55. Papazian v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. Ill (N.D. Ohio 1957); NeonSignal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Sign Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Wilson v.
J.G. Wilson Corp., 241 F. 494 (E.D. Va. 1917).
56. Counsel for Guardian only relied on two classes of cases (shop rights and real estate
leases) to support his argument that rights of a constituent corporation may pass by merger,
even though they may not otherwise be transferable. 597 F.2d at 1094. The court of appeals
concluded that these types of cases were explainable by other factors and could not be used to
support such a proposition.
57. 78 Wash.2d 778, 479 P.2d 47 (1971).
58. It is interesting to note that in Diamond Parking, the owner of the surviving corporation
had also owned all of the stock of the thee constituent corporations. Thus, under the guise of
an "assignment," the city of Seattle was trying to charge the same operator twice for the same
licenses because he had changed the form of his corporate existence.
59. SEATTLE CODE § 10.02.050 (1967) provided that: "No license issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be transferable or assignable, unless specifically otherwise provided
for." Because of the legislative policy of the Washington version of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT, WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.20.060 (1969), this ordinance, which parallels the
assignment in the PPGlnditstriscontract, was held to not prohibit the passage of the license by
merger.
60. 78 Wash.2d at 782, 479 P.2d at 49.
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Thus, the city's theory that the merger effected an assignment was found to
be in irreconcilable conflict with the legislative intent to promote merger:
If a surviving corporation must pay an additional license fee in
order to continue to enjoy a license lawfully acquired by one of the
merging corporations, an additional burden is attached. It is not
acquired subject to the same burdens and the restriction which6 1attached thereto in the hands of the consolidating corporations.
Accordingly, to require the surviving corporation to repurchase the licenses
it had acquired from the merging corporation would have been a tax on the
merger, which was contrary to the intent of the Model Business Corporation
Act.
There is very little difference between the situation in Di'amondParking
and that presented by PPGIndustrtes. Although the subject matter differs-a
nonassignable patent license versus a nonassignable municipal license-the
legal theory is the same. As was pointed out in Diamond Parking, there are
different policy considerations in a merger as compared to an assignment.
The next section will assess PPG Jndustrs in light of this theme.
IV.

THE PASSAGE OF PATENT RIGHTS BY MERGER IS NOT THE
EQUIVALENT OF ASSIGNMENT

The legal issue in PPGIndustrs was whether generally nontransferable
patent licenses may pass to the surviving corporation in a statutory merger.
The district court found that the continuity of interest inherent in a statu62
tory merger distinguishes it from ordinary assignment or transfer, and held
that the patent licenses pass to the resulting corporation by operation of law.
The court of appeals reversed and held that the merger had effected a transfer of rights in violation of the licensing agreement. 63 Because the licensing
agreement contained no express provisions prohibiting transfer in the event of
merger, the court's conclusion that "[a] transfer is no less a transfer because
it takes place by operation of law rather than by a particular act of the
parties . . . ,"64 effectively equates the general rules governing the assignment of patent licenses with those governing the passage of rights by merger.
This is the first instance in which these two competing principles have been
utilized to determine the effect of statutory merger on nonassignable patent
licenses. But, given the lack of a clear federal policy favoring the nontransferability of patents in the merger context, and given a strong statutory presumption of the free passage of rights, it is doubtful that the holding in PPG
Industries may be properly taken as support for the proposition that generally
nonassignable rights do not pass to the surviving corporation in a merger.
First, the court appeals found that the cases cited by Guardian in support of their theory that patent licenses pass to successors by operation of law
could not be used for support, because their facts took them outside the gen61. Id. at 783, 479 P.2d at 50.
62. 428 F. Supp. at 796. For a general discussion of the policy considerations involved in
statutory merger, see W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7086 (perm. ed. Supp.
1979).
63. 597 F.2d at 1090.
64. Id. at 1096.
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eral rule of nonassignability. Thus, in the court's view, the surviving corporation in Lightner v. Boston & AR. Co. 65 retained patent licenses from a
merger because the licensor had chosen both of the constituent corporations
as licensees. Accordingly the patent licenses pass to the successors in the so66
called "shop rights" cases because of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Similarly, the court considered that real estate leases pass to successors in a
merger because of the policy against restraints on alienation. But, as the
Supreme Court later recognized in Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 67 the court in
Lighlner v. Boston held that a license "is transmissible by succession to a corporation formed by the union of two licensees succeeding to the obligations
of both, for the reason that the consolidated company is the successor rather than the
licensee of the orinthalcompanies. *68 and not because the constituent corporations were licensees. Similarly, several of the "shop rights" and real estate
lease cases cited by Guardian do distinguish between an assignment of property from an acquisition of corporate property by a successor corporation in
a merger. 6 9 Thus, the proposition that the rules of assignment are distinct
from the rules governing merger is supportable.
Second, it is uncertain whether the general rule of patent nonassignability based on Hapgood v. Hewitt can be extended from a third-party assignment context to the merger situation. No clear federal policy emanates from
the cases that would inhibit the passage of rights through merger. To the
contrary, in view of the congressional intent that patent licenses shall have
all the attributes of property, 70 and considering the view of section 76(d) of
the Model Business Corporation Act and of the cases relating other nonassignable contracts to the merger statutes, 7 1 it is doubtful that any fixed rule

65. 15 F. Cas. 514 (C.C. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,343).
66. See note 24 supra.
67. 150 U.S. 193 (1893).
68. Id. at 196 (Emphasis supplied). In Lane &Bodley, the Supreme Court cited the following factors as being relevant to the application of the Llghtner V. Boston rule (that a license is
transmissible to the successor in a merger):
In the present case, it clearly appears that the company was organized on the same
basis as the firm; that the business of the company was to be the same as that carried
on by Locke & Bodley, and to be carried on in the same premises; that the entire
property and assets of the firm and its liabilities and obligations were devolved upon
the company; Locke himself, in his evidence, repeatedly speaks of the Lane & Bodley
company as the successor to the firm.
Id. This appears to be an early formulation of the theory of continuity. See note 7 supra.
69. See Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D.Pa.
1931); cf Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 120, 199 A.2d 48 (1964) (In
Segal, the New Jersey Court of Appeals considered the effect of merger on a non assignment
clause in a real estate lease. Although the court did note that for real estate there is a general
doctrine disfavoring restraints on alienation, the court held on separate grounds that merger
was not the equivalent of assignment, because the legislature had mandated that
[T]he rights, privileges, powers, franchises 'and all and every interest' of each constituent corporation shall vest in the successor corporation. The passage of such interest
under the statute, whether labeled an assignment, sub-lease, or transfer, is by operation of law and it will not operate as a breach of a covenant barring assignment.
Id. at 123, 199 A.2d at 50. Accord, Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club,
361 Mo. 981, 238 S.W.2d 321 (1951) (holding that the merger sections of the National Banking
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 34(a) (1946), precluded a claim that an assignment had been effected). See
generally 3a G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1212, 68,73 (Supp. 1980).).
70. Patent Statute of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976).
71. See note 40 supra for the full text of the Model Business Corporation Act.
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of construction can be drawn based on licenses where there are no express
provisions regarding merger.
Finally, the view that a transfer by operation of law is the equivalent of
transfer by act of the parties is clearly inconsistent with the language of the
merger statutes as represented by the Model Act, section 76(d), which provides that all rights, privileges, and franchises in a merger are transferred to
and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed. 72 This
language has been interpreted as authorizing the transfer of property by operation of law and not by act of the parties. 73 Therefore, the principles governing the transfer of property are not equivalent to the principles governing
assignments and transfers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals broke new ground with its analysis
of the effect of statutory merger on generally nonassignable patent licenses.
The precedential value of PPGIndustries, however, is uncertain because the
court utilized two distinct approaches for its conclusion that several patent
licenses had not passed from a constituent corporation to the surviving corporation in a merger. In its first approach, the court applied traditional
rules of construction to conclude that the parties had intended to prohibit
the transfer of the licenses in the event of merger. This analysis serves as
useful instruction to future drafters of patent licensing contracts to include
express provision for merger in the agreement. The second approach is more
problematical.
The court devised a sophisticated legal theory to affect the curious metamorphosis of a transfer by operation of law to a general rule of patent license nontransferability. The court's conclusion that "[a] transfer is no less a
transfer because it takes place by operation of law rather than by particular
acts of the parties . . .74 effectively equates the general rules governing the
passage of rights by merger with the principles of assignment and transfer.
This equation irreconcilably conflicts with the statutory rules of merger and
departs from a large body of law predicated on the theory of corporate continuity. The holding in PPG Industries is expansive, but it should be limited
72. Id.
73. As was held in American Cement Corp. v. Dunetz Bros., Inc., 47 Misc.2d 747, 752, 263
N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (Sup. Ct. 1965), discussing the effect of merger on a nontransferable lien, the
court considered the New York version of § 76(d) of the Model Act:
More comprehensive language could not be employed to indicate the intention
that any right, privilege, or property of any and every nature and kind that was vested
in the old corporations should be by operation of law transferred to and vested in the
new corporation unimpaired by the act of consolidation. It would be contrary to the
expressed intention of the Legislature by a narrow construction to cut down or limit
the broad and comprehensive language of this statute.
74. 597 F.2d at 1096.
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to its facts with the view that the parties had agreed to prohibit transfer
upon merger. Otherwise, this case provides a basis for the disruption of the
orderly succession of corporate rights as envisioned by the common law and
the Model Business Corporation Act.
Peler T Moore

